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The Issue 
Over the past 25 years, traditional agricultural co-operatives have been  challenged by 
competition from local investor-owned firms and multinational companies, deregulation 
and  globalization  of  trade,  and  increased  market  concentration  in  suppliers  and 
purchasers. At the same time, co-operatives have constantly been seeking to add value to 
their member services through expansion and/or adoption of new technology. The capital 
investment  needed  for  these  endeavours  has  to  be  financed,  and  for  traditional  co-
operatives the major source of financing new investments has been long-term borrowing. 
As a result some co-operatives are characterized by high debt loads, which may result in 
increased  financial  risk  exposure.  Important  factors  that  may  influence  the  level  of 
financial risk exposure are the potential conflicts between managerial self-interest and the 
interest of the owners of the firm (Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the 
impact of these differences on the choice of capital structure (Friend and Lang, 1988; 
  Current 
Agriculture, Food 
& Resource Issues 
A Journal of the Canadian Agricultural Economics Society Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  G. Hailu, E. W. Goddard and S. R. Jeffrey 
 
 
      64 
Firth, 1995; Matthews et al., 1994). Despite the considerable literature (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Lewis and Sappington, 1995), the impact that differences in attitudes 
between  managers and directors/members have upon the decision making process has 
remained  a  relatively  unexplained  aspect  of  agency  problems,  especially  in  member-
owned  firms.  This article assesses the social-psychological and demographic variables 
that affect co-operative decision makers’ attitudes toward long-term debt financing and 
their intentions to increase long-term borrowing.  
Implications and Conclusions 
This  study  finds  that  managers  and  directors  of  co-operatives  differ  in  their  attitudes 
toward long-term borrowing. These differences, if not resolved, may result in significant 
costs associated with resolving conflicts (agency costs), or may hamper the success of the 
co-operative business (Hailu et al., 2004; Jensen, 1986). Additionally, those respondents 
who have favourable attitudes toward long-term borrowing, are subject to social influence 
from  their  referents  (e.g.,  friends,  colleagues,  spouse,  etc.)  and  gamble  frequently  are 
found to be more likely to increase long-term borrowing for business expansion.  
Background 
Within the finance literature, a decision maker’s (DM’s) financial risk attitude assessment 
is considered to be an important factor in determining successful business outcomes (e.g., 
Firth, 1995; Weber and Hsee, 1998; Barton and Gordon, 1988; Matthews et al., 1994). As 
well, the potential conflicts between managerial self-interest and the interests of owners 
(Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the impact of these differences on the 
choice of capital structure (Friend and Lang, 1988; Firth, 1995; Matthews et al., 1994) 
have been acknowledged by many researchers. Despite the considerable literature (e.g., 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Lewis and Sappington, 1995), the impact that differences in 
attitudes  between  managers  and  directors/members  have  upon  the  decision  making 
process has remained a relatively unexplained aspect of agency problems, especially in 
member-owned  firms.  Any  information  concerning  the  risk  attitudes  of  managers  and 
directors (BODs) for co-operative businesses is useful in identifying potential sources of 
conflict in decisions regarding training, personnel selection, and placement.  Moreover, 
assessment of risk attitudes of managers and directors may have important implications 
for the design and choice of alternative financial risk management strategies/policies and 
the performance/success of co-operative businesses. Among other things, the process of 
risk management
2 is likely affected by the risk attitude of business DMs (Tufano, 1998).  
A current issue in co-operative finance concerns the capital constraints facing user-
owned organizations, given the financial risks associated with various sources of capital. 
Some Canadian co-operative agribusinesses are in financial distress as a result of taking 
on too much debt (Goddard, 2002). While taking on a high level of debt can enhance the 
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payments attributable to members in good economic conditions, the same debt will also 
increase bankruptcy risks or agency costs (Berens and Cuny, 1995). Co-operatives with 
relatively  high  debt-to-equity  ratios  may  exhibit  more  variability  in  terms  of  returns. 
Moreover, higher aggregate co-operative sector–level leverage may be associated with co-
operative business instability. According to Robison and Barry (1987), optimal debt for a 
business depends on, among other things, the DM’s risk attitude. For example, a risk 
averse  DM  would  tend  to  hold  less  debt  (MacCrimmon  and  Weherug,  1986),  ceteris 
paribus.  Moreover,  as  opposed  to  managers,  directors/members  are  likely  to  tolerate 
higher  debt-to-equity  ratios  in  the  firm’s  capital  structure  since  they  hold  diversified 
portfolios (Firth, 1995). On the other hand, based on the takeover hypothesis, managers 
who believe they are under a threat of takeover (Stultz, 1988) may desire higher levels of 
debt as the presence of high leverage may repel the potential bidders through the threat of 
coinsurance (Billett, 1996; Safieddine and Titman, 1999). Thus, in developing risk-based 
ranges  of  optimal  debt  policies,  the  extent  to  which  managers  or  boards  of  directors 
(BODs) exhibit risk taking or risk averse behaviour when making decisions with a variety 
of financial data is of specific interest.  
Issues  around  risk  attitudes  may  also  be  linked  to  firm  performance.  Since  the 
objective  of  a  co-operative  business  is  the  maximization  of  its  members’  welfare 
(Bateman,  Edwards  and  LeVay  1979;  Enke,  1945),  efficient  allocation  of  the  co-
operative’s  resources  will  be  critical  in  determining  whether  the  co-operative  is 
competitive  nationally  and/or  internationally.  Theoretical  evidence  suggests  that  co-
operative  businesses  are  less  efficient  than  investor-owned  firms  (Sexton,  Wilson  and 
Wann, 1989), possibly due to a lack of business expertise on the part of directors as 
compared to directors of investor-owned firms (Helmberger, 1966) and the lack of an 
incentive  structure  in  co-operatives  to  induce  management  to  run  the  association 
efficiently (Caves and Petersen, 1986). These problems may be related to risk attitude 
differentials  between  managers  and  directors,  leading  to  differing  opinions  regarding 
investment, consolidation and borrowing and ultimately firm financial risk exposure and 
implemented risk management strategies.  
Agency  theory  suggests  that  conflicts  between  owners  and  managers  can  arise 
because  of  differences  in  their  attitudes  toward  risk  (Eisenhardt,  1989).  Because  of 
different risk preferences, managers and directors may prefer different actions. Thus, risk 
attitude  incompatibility  may  impede  overall  efficiency  of  resource  use.  In  terms  of 
Canadian co-operative businesses, relatively little is known about the risk attitudes of co-
operative  business  DMs.  Moreover,  previous  studies  have  not  attempted  to  scrutinize 
empirically  the  impact  of  risk  attitude  differentials  on  co-operative  capital  structure 
decision  processes  and,  ultimately,  on  firm  value.  This  study  examines  the  degree  to 
which differences in risk attitudes exist between co-operative managers and directors. The 
impact managers’ and directors’ attitudes toward debt have on their intention to take on 
additional debt is also examined.  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  G. Hailu, E. W. Goddard and S. R. Jeffrey 
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A Conceptual Behavioural Model:  
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TpB) 
With its foundation in social psychology literature, the theory of planned behaviour (TpB) 
is the model most widely used to describe and measure a DM’s attitude toward an object, 
his or her behavioural intention and his or her behaviour. In this study the use of the TpB 
allows  the  incorporation  of  the  DM’s  perception,  preference,  experience,  belief, 
facilitating conditions and social pressure in the measurement of attitude toward debt and 
its impact on the resulting capital structure (Matthews et al., 1994). The theory of planned 
behaviour  has  been  applied  to  predict  behaviour  in  diverse  contexts  from  managerial 
performance  benchmarking  (Hill,  Mann  and  Wearing,  1996),  consumer  purchasing 
(Brinberg and Cummings, 1983), cigarette use (Budd, 1986) and effects of advertising on 
attitude  (Berger  and  Mitchell,  1989)  to  capital  strucure  decision  making  processes 
(Matthews et al., 1994), among others. 
The  TpB states that an individual’s behaviour can be predicted if observers know 
(1) his or her attitude toward a particular behaviour, (2) his or her intention to perform the 
behaviour,  (3)  his  or  her  beliefs  with  respect  to  the  consequences  of  performing  that 
behaviour and (4) the social norms which govern that behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Behaviour 
is  a  function  of  intention  to  perform  and  perceived  behavioural  control  (or  ability  to 
perform the behaviour). Figure 1 depicts the relationship between intention and behaviour.    
The individual’s intention to perform a given behaviour (e.g., intention to increase 
debt capital) is a central construct in the theory of planned behaviour and reflects how 
individuals  are  motivated  to  try  to  perform  the  behaviour  in  question  (Ajzen,  1991). 
Basically, the TpB (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) states that human behaviour is determined 
by the formation of prior intentions, and that intentions are formed on the basis of  a 
weighted combination of attitudinal (A) and normative (SN) factors. According to Ajzen 
(1991), an individual DM’s behavioural intention is affected by the attitude toward the 
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behaviour,  the  subjective  norm  and  perceived  behavioural  control.  Attitude  is  the 
individual’s feeling and belief about the behaviour. Subjective norm refers to approval of 
a  person’s  important  referents  with  regard  to  the  consequences  of  performing  the 
behaviour or not. Perceived behavioural control refers to the degree to which a person 
feels that his or her performance or non-performance of the behaviour is under his or her 
control (Ajzen, 1991). Perceived behavioural control is hypothesized to have an impact on 
both the intention to perform the behaviour and the behaviour per se.  
Empirically, attitudes toward actions (e.g., debt leveraging) are determined by and can 
be measured as the sum of evaluative salient behavioural belief, where behavioural beliefs 
are beliefs held about the consequences of the action in question. The basic form of the 
Fishbein multi-attribute attitude model can be expressed as  
(1)  Aj = bijai
i=1
n
! ,   
where Aj is an individual’s attitude toward an object j (e.g., debt leveraging); bij is the 
individual’s belief, expressed as a subjective probability that object j is associated with 
some attribute i; ai is the evaluative aspect (i.e., judged goodness or badness) of attribute i; 
and  n  is  the  number  of  salient  beliefs.  Equation  (1)  represents  a  model  of  attribute 
measurement wherein the strengths of an individual’s beliefs about particular attributes 
are  weighted  and  summed  to  yield  an  index  of  overall  attitude.  It  is  assumed  that  a 
person’s attitude toward the behaviour is proportional (∝) to this summative index (Ajzen, 
1991).  
Subjective norm (SN) is obtained by summing the products of the strength for each 
normative belief (NBi) and the motivation to comply (MCi) with the referent in question, 
over the m normative beliefs. Normative belief is a belief about what a specific referent 
person thinks one should or should not do regarding borrowing. Individuals who believe 
that most referents with whom they are motivated to comply think they should endorse 
borrowing will perceive social pressure to do so. It is assumed that a person’s subjective 
norm is proportional (∝) to the resulting summative index. Thus, subjective norm can be 
expressed as 
(2)  SN = NBi
i=1
m
! MCi , 
where NBi is the DM’s normative belief that the salient reference thinks he or she should 
(or should not) perform the behaviour and MCi is the DM’s motivation to comply with 
that referent (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980).  
To obtain a measure of perceived behavioural control (PBC) each control belief (CBk, 
the assessment as to whether or not a given control factor – e.g., decision making power – 
makes  it  harder  or  easier  to  endorse  additional borrowing)  is  multiplied  by  perceived 
behavioural facilitation (PFk, the assessment of the strength of the given control factor – 
e.g., decision making power – in actually affecting borrowing) of the particular control 
factor to facilitate or inhibit performance of behaviour, and the resulting products are Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  G. Hailu, E. W. Goddard and S. R. Jeffrey 
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summed  across  the  r  salient  control  beliefs  to  produce  the  perception  of  behavioural 
control (PBC); that is,  




Overall, the motivational factors that influence behaviour are assumed to be captured 
by intention to perform a given behaviour. Intentions are the indications of how much of 
an effort the DMs are planning to exert in order to perform the behaviour. Behavioural 
intention represents the person’s motivation to perform the behaviour in question.  
The above theoretical constructs are latent variables in that they cannot be directly 
observed  but  must  be  inferred  from  observable  responses.  The  theory  of  planned 
behaviour can be used to organize the key concepts of behaviour and to predict behaviour. 
In this case, the behaviour in question is debt financing. Once the information on attitude 
toward risk or debt capital, subjective norm and perceived behavioural control is obtained, 
the  next  step  is  to  investigate  which  of  the  three  is  the  best  predictor  of  intention  to 
increase/decrease  debt  capital;  that  is,  BI =w1A+w2SN +w3PBC ,  where  the  w’s  are 
parameters to be estimated.  
In the empirical literature, the TpB has been modified to include individuals’ previous 
habits or behaviours and socio-demographic variables. For example, using the Fishbein 
and Ajzen approach, Bentler and Speckart (1979) modeled attitudes, subjective norms, 
intentions and past behaviour and subsequent behaviour. The behavioural model is also 
versatile in accommodating socio-demographic variables. Identification of differences in 
attitudes attributable to a DM’s gender, age, manager or director status, income, education 
and awareness of risk management practices is an important outcome of the study.  
Data and Methods 
A questionnaire was constructed according to the TpB. Survey questionnaires were sent to 
139 managers and directors of co-operative agribusiness firms. Of these, 30 completed 
questionnaires were returned, for a response rate of 22 percent. The respondents included 
2  females  and  28  males;  14  were  managers  while  the  other  16  were  directors. 
Approximately 67 percent of the respondents had more than high school education; 30 
percent were above the age of 54 years; 50 percent had before-tax household income in 
2003  of  at  least  C$100,000.  More  than  80  percent  of  the  respondents  were  from 
agribusiness supply co-operatives, while the rest of the respondents were from feed mills 
and  fruit  and  flower  co-operatives.  Besides  the  responses  considered  in  the  current 
analysis,  company  background,  awareness  of  different  risk  management  strategies, 
frequency of previous gambling activities and perceptions of importance and effectiveness 
of risk management strategies were also elicited.
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Information on social-psychological variables (BI, A, SN, PBC) are obtained using 
the  TpB  model.  Measures  for  attitude,  SN  and  PBC  are  given  in  tables  1,  2  and  3, 
respectively.  
Intention is a measure of the extent to which an individual is motivated to approve 
additional borrowing. Two items, each based on a 7-point Likert scale are used to measure 
behavioural intention. These include the following statements: (1) During the next two 
years I will approve additional borrowing to finance investment in the company; (very 
unlikely – very likely) and (2) If you were told that a higher level of debt leads to higher 
returns to equity because of tax benefits, how would it affect your intention to finance 
proposed expansion using 100% long-term debt? (would not borrow – would borrow). 
Based on this information, the attitudinal index is derived for each individual as in 
table 1. Each respondent is asked to respond to a series of statements, such as, Increasing 
expected returns to members’ equity is …, using a 7-point Likert scale response from 
“very bad” to “very good”. The individual’s responses are indexed from -3 to +3 and used 
as the outcome evaluation measure. The respondent is then asked to respond to another 
series of statements, such as, If I approve 100% long-term debt financing of expansions it 
will increase returns to members’ equity, again using a 7-point Likert scale response from 
“very unlikely” to “very likely”. The individual’s responses are indexed numerically from 
1 to 7 and used as the belief strength measure. The products of outcome evaluation and 
belief strength are summed over all of the statements to obtain an overall attitudinal index. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the statements from the survey and numerically indexed 
responses for a sample respondent, to illustrate the method used. In this case, the overall 
attitude index value is 13. This person’s attitude toward increasing borrowing is, then, 
predicted to be positive. 
To  measure  subjective  norm,  individuals  are  asked  to  respond  to  a  series  of 
statements, such as, My colleagues think that I should approve long-term borrowing for 
Table 1  Decision Makers’ Beliefs about Long-term Debt Financing of  





strength  Product 
1.  Increasing expected returns to shareholder/member 
equity   1  5  5 
2.  Overcoming capital constraint problems   3  5  15 
3.  Benefiting from the tax deductibility of interest charge  -2  4  -8 
4.  Increasing likelihood of bankruptcy   1  6  6 
5.  Increasing profit   -1  1  -1 
6.  Increasing financial risk exposure  -1  2  -2 
7.  Reducing future flexibility  -1  2  -2 
8.  Making a safe investment   0  6  0 
    Sum  13 
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business  expansion  …,  using  a  7-point  Likert  scale  response  from  “very  strongly 
disagree” to “ very strongly agree”. Each individual’s responses are indexed from -3 to +3 
and used as the motivation to comply measure. Individuals are then asked to respond to 
another series of statements, such as, Doing what my colleagues think is …, again using a  
7-point Likert scale response from “very unlikely” to “very likely”. Their responses are 
indexed numerically from 1 to 7 and used as the normative beliefs measure. The products 
of motivation to comply and normative beliefs are summed over all of the statements to 
obtain an overall subjective norm index. Table 2 provides a summary of the statements 
from the survey and numerically indexed responses for a sample respondent, to illustrate 
the method used. In this case, the overall subjective norm index value is -8. This person’s 
subjective norm toward increasing borrowing is, then, predicted to be negative.  
Table 2  Subjective Norms (Sample Respondent) 
Referents  Motivation to comply  Normative beliefs
4  Products 
1.  Colleagues   1  0  0 
2.  Shareholders/members   -1  1  -1 
3.  Senior management   0  2  0 
4.  Boards of directors   1  2  2 
5.  Spouse   -3  3  -9 
6.  Friends   0  0  0 
7.  Parents   0  0  0 
    Sum  -8 
To measure perceived behavioural control, individuals are asked to respond to a series 
of statements, such as, If I want to have more decision making power I can easily find out, 
using a 7-point Likert scale  response from  “very strongly disagree” to “very strongly 
agree”. An individual’s responses are indexed from -3 to +3 and used as the perceived 
behavioural facilitation measure. Individuals are then asked to respond to another series 
of statements, such as, I could approve long-term debt to finance business expansion more 
easily if I had more decision making power, again using a 7-point Likert scale response 
from “very unlikely” to “very likely”. The responses are indexed numerically from 1 to 7 
and  used  as  the  control  beliefs  measure.  The  products  of  perceived  behavioural 
facilitation and control beliefs are summed over all of the statements to obtain an overall 
perceived behavioural control index. Table 3 provides a summary of the statements from 
the survey and numerically indexed responses for a sample respondent, to illustrate the 
method used. The overall subjective norm index value in this case is -12. This person’s 
perceived  behavioural  control  toward  increasing  borrowing  is,  then,  predicted  to  be 
negative.  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  G. Hailu, E. W. Goddard and S. R. Jeffrey 
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Based on the theory of planned behaviour, the following regression equations are 
specified:  
(4)  Ai =!0 + ! jDemoji
j=1
n
" + #1i , 
(5)  SNi =!0 + ! jDemoji
j=1
n
" + #2i , 
(6)  PBCi =!0 + !jDemoji
j=1
n
" + #3i, and 
(7)  BIi = !0 +!1Ai +!2SNi +!3PBCi + !jDemoji
j=1
n
" + #4i , 
where,  for  individual  i,  BIi  is  observed  behavioural  intention;  Ai  is  attitude  toward 
behaviour; SNi is subjective norm; PBCi is perceived behavioural control; Demo refers to 
demographic characteristics (age, manager-director dummy variable, age, income); β, α, δ 
and φ are parameters to be estimated;  and ε’s  are i.i.d. disturbance terms.  The above 
equations are estimated independently. 
When the dependent variable takes more than two values, but these values have a 
natural ordering, the ordered probit model is often appropriate (McKelvey and Zavoina, 
1975).  Since  the  dependent  variable  for  behavioural  intention  is  an  ordinal  response, 
ordinary least squares may not be appropriate. Thus, an ordered probit model is proposed 
to estimate the equation for behavioural intention.  
Table 3  Perceived Behavioural Control (Sample Respondent) 





1.  Decision making power   -2  1  -2 
2.  Tax benefits of borrowing   -2  1  -2 
3.  Risks of borrowing   -2  -1  2 
4.  Benefits of borrowing   -2  -1  2 
5.  Debt maturity structure   -2  1  -2 
6.  Likelihood of occurrences of bankruptcy   -1  1  -1 
7.  Level of equity reserve   0  2  0 
8.  Attitudes of shareholders/members toward 
borrowing   1  -1  -1 
9.  Extent of interest rate risk exposure   1  -1  -1 
10.  Term structure of interest rates   0  1  0 
11.  Costs of borrowing   1  1  1 
12.  Level of competition   2  -2  -4 
13.  The shareholders’/members’ financial 
commitment   2  -2  -4 
    Sum  -12 
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Ordered  response  regression  recognizes  the  indexed  nature  of  various  response 
variables. Underlying the indexing in such models is a latent but continuous descriptor of 
the  response.  In  an  ordered  probit  regression,  the  random  error  associated  with  this 
continuous descriptor is assumed to follow a normal distribution. The observed and coded 
discrete behavioural intention variable (i.e., 1,2....,J), BI, is determined from the model as 
follows: 
(8)  BIi
* = !0 +!1Ai +!2SNi +!3PBCi + !jDemoji
j=1
n
" + #4i , 
where BIi
* is a latent and continuous measure of behavioural intention for the i-th DM and 
J represents possible values of BIi. The relationship between BIi
* and BIi is defined in 
terms of threshold parameters (µ’s) to be estimated with β; that is, BIi=1, if µ0<BIi
*≤µ1; 
BIi=2, if µ1<BIi
*≤µ2,…; BIi=J, if BIi
*>µj-1. In the above, the respondents have their own 
intensity  of  behavioural  intention.  The  intensity  of  behavioural  intention  depends  on 
observed exogenous variables, and unobservable factors,!4i . The ordered probit model is 
based on an assumption that respondents could respond to the question with their own BIi
* 
if asked to do so. Given only seven or five possible discrete answers (depending on the 
question), respondents opt for the choice that most closely represents their own intentions 
on  the  question  (Greene,  2000).  However,  one  of  the  undesirable  consequences  of 
applying linear regression is that “it implicitly assumes that respondents who give the 
same response have exactly the same attitude” (Daykin and Moffatt, 2002). This may not 
be the case, as a particular response  may be consistent with a range of attitudes, and 
ignoring  such  differences  may  lead  to  biased  estimates.  The  ordered  probit  model 
accommodates such differences. 
With the assumption that  !4i is distributed normally across sample observations, the 
probability that BIi falls into the j-th category is given by 
(9)  Prob(BI = j)= ! µj "#'x ( )"! µj+1 "#'x ( ) ,   
where Φ denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function and µj and µj+1 
denote  the  upper  and  lower  threshold  values,  respectively,  for  the  j-th  category, 
respectively. If j is the lower category, then the lower threshold value is -∞ and the upper 
threshold value is zero. If j is the higher category, the upper threshold value is +∞. For all 
probabilities to be positive, the ordering  0 < µ1 < µ2 <...< µJ!1 must hold. The estimated 
coefficients  from  an  ordered  probit  regression  do  not  have  an  intuitive  interpretation. 
Therefore, marginal effects are calculated to provide more information. For the above 
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where φ is the standard normal density function. Note that the marginal effects sum to 
zero (Greene, 2000). The marginal effect for binary explanatory variables is estimated as 
the difference between Prob BI = j ( )| x =1 and Prob BI = j ( )| x = 0. 
Survey Results 
Attitudes toward Long-term Borrowing 
The test for differences in attitude toward long-term borrowing between managers and 
directors of agribusiness co-operatives is conducted based on the information gathered 
using  TpB  procedures.  For  each  individual,  the  index  for  attitudes  toward  long-term 
borrowing is constructed as in table 1. Both a t-test and a Mann-Whitney test are then 
applied to assess if there are any differences in attitudes between managers and directors 
of  co-operative  firms  (table  4).  Results  from  both  tests  suggest  there  are  statistically 
significant  mean  differences  between  managers  and  directors  in  attitudes  toward 
increasing  borrowing.  This  may  indicate  that  directors  tend  to  have  more  favourable 
attitudes toward a higher debt-to-equity ratio. This is consistent with evidence from co-
operatives  in  Portugal  showing  that  managers  generally  tend  to  adopt  management 
practices that reduce debt-to-equity ratios while members do the opposite (Rebelo, Caldas 
and Matulich, 2003). In the United States, Kenkel, Holcomb and Ac Bol (2003) have also 
found  that  managers  and  board  members  differ  significantly  in  their  attitudes  toward 
value-added activities and new generation co-operatives on several issues. The results are 
also consistent with the principal-agent theory proposition that managers prefer moderate 
or low levels of corporate debt as it is in their interest to reduce the chances of company 
bankruptcy (Firth, 1995). 
Table 4  Tests for Differing Attitudes toward Additional Long-term Borrowing (N=30) 
T-test for equality of means  Nonparametric test 
Mean difference (manager-director)  -1.923  Mann-Whitney U  57.5 
t-statistics  -2.424  Wilcoxon W  162.5 
Degrees of freedom  28  Z  -2.269 
P-value  0.022  P-value  0.023 
Determinants of Attitudes toward  
Increased Borrowing, Subjective Norm and PBC  
One of the objectives of this study is to investigate factors that influence DMs’ attitudes 
toward long-term borrowing and their behavioural intention to borrow more in order to 
finance business expansion. In particular, are DM attitudes toward long-term borrowing 
and their behavioural intentions to approve additional borrowing related to their personal 
characteristics and social-psychological factors? First, factors that are believed to affect 
attitudes,  subjective  norms  and  perceived  behavioural  control  are  investigated  using 
multiple  regressions.  Second,  the  impacts  of  attitude,  subjective  norm,  perceived Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  G. Hailu, E. W. Goddard and S. R. Jeffrey 
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behavioural  control,  frequency  of  previous  gambling  behaviour,  and  individual 
characteristics on behavioural intentions are investigated using ordered probit regression. 
The parameter estimates for equations (4)–(6) are obtained using least-square procedures 
(table  5)  whereas  those  for  equation  (8)  are  obtained  using  a  maximum  likelihood 
procedure in TSP 4.5 (tables 6 and 7).  
Results from multiple regression analysis indicate that 37.3 percent, 17.6 percent and 
21.7  percent  of  the  variations  in  attitude,  subjective  norm  and  perceived  behavioural 
control, respectively, are explained by respondent characteristics. Being a manager has a 
negative  impact  on  the  values  (indices)  of  attitude,  subjective  norm  and  perceived 
behavioural control. As opposed to directors, managers may have unfavourable opinions 
toward increases in long-term borrowing to finance business expansion. Being a manager 
also has a negative effect on subjective norm. As opposed to directors, managers also 
perceive  that  they  have  less  control  over  co-operative  business  decisions.  Age  has  a 
statistically significant relationship to attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioural 
control. Sample  DMs  who are older than 54 years  of age have unfavourable feelings 
toward increases in long-term borrowing.  
Determinants of Behavioural Intention 
The next step is to investigate the impacts of social-psychological variables (i.e., attitude, 
subjective  norm  and  perceived  behavioural  control)  and  respondent  characteristics  on 
behavioural intention to increase long-term borrowing. In this study 53.3 percent of the 
respondents report that they intend to approve additional long-term borrowing over the 
next two years; 13.3 percent are “very likely” to approve additional borrowing. Moreover, 
63 percent of the respondents state that, if there are tax benefits, they are neutral about 
increasing additional borrowing. When respondents were asked their intentions to finance 
expansions  using  100  percent  long-term  debt  if  costs  of  borrowing  are  low,  only  15 
Table 5  Multiple Regression Estimates of Determinants of Attitude, Subjective Norms 
and Perceived Behavioural Control (N=30) 
Variable  Attitude  Subjective norm  PBC 
Intercept  19.734***  (4.124)  3.371  (1.339)  25.561***  (3.061) 
Manager   -14.008***  (-2.980)  -4.538*  (-1.834)  -16.600**  (-2.024) 
Age old   -16.676***  (-3.225)  -0.600  (-0.221)  -12.881  (-1.427) 
Income high   -1.903  (-0.392)  -3.174  (-1.242)  8.177  (0.965) 
Education high   -1.980  (-0.437)  -0.140  (-0.059)  -6.647  (-0.841) 
R
2  0.373    0.176    0.217   
Manager = 1, if a manager, 0 otherwise; age old = 1, if age > 54, 0 otherwise; income high = 1, if 
income > $100,000, 0 otherwise; and education high = 1, if > high school, 0 otherwise.  
Figures in parentheses are t-statistic.  
***, **, and * represent 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively. 
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percent replied that they are “inclined to borrow”, whereas 23 percent are “not inclined to 
borrow”. 
As  in  the  discussion  earlier,  the  behavioural  intention  variables  are  based  on  the 
responses to two survey questions: willingness to approve additional borrowing (model I); 
tax benefits of debt and intention to borrow (model II
5). For both models the estimated 
threshold  parameters  have  the  expected  ordering.  Positive  parameter  estimates  for  the 
social-psychological variables and individual characteristics suggest that the likelihood of 
intention to approve additional borrowing increases for models I and II. 
Table 6 shows parameter estimates for model I. Attitude and frequency of previous 
gambling behaviour have statistically significant relationships with behavioural intention. 
Table 6  Factors Affecting Behavioural Intention to Approve Additional Borrowing to 
Finance New Investment: Model I (N=30) 
Model I: During the next two years I will approve additional borrowing to finance new investments in the 
company. 
     
Marginal effects 
Variables 





















































































Intercept  0.860  (1.115)               
A  0.031**  (2.172)  -0.007  -0.002  -0.003  0.001  0.005  0.004  0.003 
SN  0.006  (0.837)               
PBC  -0.006  (-1.404)               
FPB  0.025**  (1.979)  -0.008  -0.001  0.001  0.001  0.005  0.002  0.001 
Manager   0.425  (1.099)               
Age old   -0.405  (-0.988)               
Income high   -0.067  (-0.175)               
Education high   0.262  (0.631)               
µ2  0.337*  (1.595)               
µ3  1.197***  (3.687)               
µ4  1.429***  (4.077)               
µ5  2.267***  (5.427)               
µ6  2.920***  (7.331)               
Log likelihood  -48.414                 
Schwarz B.I.C.  72.222                  
R
2  0.356                 
A:  attitude;  SN:  subjective  norm;  PBC:  perceived  behavioural  control;  FPB:  previous  gambling 
behaviour; manager = 1, if a manager, 0 otherwise; age old = 1, if age > 54, 0 otherwise; income high 
= 1, if income > $100,000, 0 otherwise; and education high = 1, if > high school, 0 otherwise.  
Figures in parentheses are t-statistic.  
***, **, and * represent 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  G. Hailu, E. W. Goddard and S. R. Jeffrey 
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Based on the marginal effects, the probability of approving additional borrowing increases 
with  increased  value  of  attitude.  This  may  suggest  that  respondents  with  favourable 
attitudes  tend  to  endorse  additional  borrowing.  In  the  same  vein,  the  probability  of 
approving additional borrowing increases with increased frequency of previous gambling 
behaviour. The individual characteristics specified in the model do not have statistically 
significant impacts on behavioural intention for model I.  
The parameter estimates for model II are presented in table 7. For this model, attitude, 
subjective  norm,  age  and  income  level  have  statistically  significant  associations  with 
behavioural intention. In terms of marginal effects, a unit “increase” in favourable attitude 
toward long-term borrowing increases the probability of approving additional borrowing 
for  business  expansion.  All  other  things  being  equal,  a  unit  increase  in  the  value  of 
Table 7  Factors Affecting Behavioural Intention to Approve Additional Borrowing to 
Finance New Investment When There Are Tax Benefits: Model II (N=30) 
Model II: If you were told that higher level of debt leads to higher returns to equity because of tax benefits, 
how would it affect your intention to finance proposed expansions using 100% long-term debt?   
      Marginal effects 
Variables 




















































































































Intercept  4.391***  (3.924)             
A  0.106***  (3.914)  -1.8E-07  -1.2E-05  -0.0002  -0.0082  0.0082  0.0002 
SN  0.024**  (1.988)  -4E-08  -3E-06  -5E-05  -0.0019  0.0019  4E-05 
PBC  -0.001  (-0.198)             
PB  -0.007  (-0.507)             
Manager   0.184  (0.312)             
Age old   -1.533***  (-2.564)  0.0016  0.0205  0.0882  -0.0998  -0.0105  -0.0001 
Income high   -3.031***  (-3.558)  0.0334  0.1513  0.2753  -0.4323  -0.0275  -0.0003 
Education high   0.250  (0.489)             
µ2  0.936*  (1.891)             
µ3  1.735***  (3.727)             
µ4  6.778***  (6.627)             
µ5  8.298***  (7.936)             
Log likelihood  -19.526               
Schwarz B.I.C.  41.634               
R
2  0.787               
A:  attitude;  SN:  subjective  norm;  PBC:  perceived  behavioural  control;  FPB:  previous  gambling 
behaviour; manager = 1, if a manager, 0 otherwise; age old = 1, if age > 54, 0 otherwise; income high 
= 1, if income > $100,000, 0 otherwise; and education high = 1, if > high school, 0 otherwise.  
Figures in parentheses are t-statistic.  
***, **, and * represent 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively. 
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subjective  norm  increases  the  probability  of  intending  to  borrow  to  finance  business 
expansion. This may suggest that individuals with higher social influence from referents 
(i.e., colleagues, spouse, etc.) are less likely to approve additional borrowing for business 
expansion.  Age  and  income  have  statistically  significant  negative  effects  on  the 
probability of intention to finance business expansion through borrowing. Older sample 
respondents  are  less  likely  to  approve  additional  borrowing  for  business  expansion. 
Higher income category respondents are also less likely to approve, which could be the 
case  because  of  the  positive  correlation  between  age  and  income  for  the  sample 
respondents. 
Summary and Conclusions 
For  the  sample  respondents,  there  are  statistically  significant  differences  in  attitudes 
toward  long-term  borrowing  between  managers  and  directors.  These  differences  may 
result in agency problems emanating from conflicting preferences. The differences, if not 
resolved, may result in significant costs related to resolving conflicts (agency costs) or 
may hamper the success of the co-operative business. The conflicts of preference among 
decision makers may delay the process of decision making and, hence, may negatively 
affect actual business performance. 
Results  from  the  ordered  probit  model  suggest  that  those  respondents  who  have 
favourable  attitudes  toward  long-term  borrowing,  are  subject  to  social  influence  from 
referents and gamble frequently are more likely to intend to increase long-term borrowing 
to support business expansion.  
Findings from this study have several managerial implications. First, given results 
from other studies (e.g., agency costs, as discussed in Hailu et al., 2004), differences in 
DMs’  attitudes  toward  debt  and  risk  may  affect  corporate  financial  risk  management. 
Tufano (1998) found that the level of managerial risk aversion affected corporate risk 
management policy in the North American gold mining industry. Demsentz and  Lehn 
(1985) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that if managers’ holdings are substantial, 
their motivations become aligned with those of shareholders and the agency problem is 
reduced. In the case of a co-operative business, where managers have no equity holdings 
in the business, the motivations of managers and directors may not be very well aligned. 
Thus, differences in risk attitudes may be expected. Second, acknowledging and aligning 
differing DMs’ attitudes through technical support may facilitate the optimization of the 
overall  co-operative  goals.  Hence,  evidence  from  the  survey  may  suggest  a  need  for 
technical  support  for  co-operative  decision  makers  in  the  area  of  financial  risk 
management. 
Although the results from this study may not be conclusive due to the small sample 
size,  it  may  provide  direction  and  suggestions  for  future  research.  Further  research  is 
warranted to assess the degree to which manager-director differences in attitude toward 
long-term borrowing affect the success of the business. As well, does this result extend to Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  G. Hailu, E. W. Goddard and S. R. Jeffrey 
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a  larger  and  diversified  sample  of  managers  and  directors?  In  order  to  explore  the 
implications of divergence in risk preference and attitude toward long-term borrowing, 
simulation based on a multiple-criteria, multiple-DM model is proposed. A larger sample 
size drawn from diverse co-operative types and structures would merit more confidence in 
the representativeness of the results.  
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Endnotes 
1 This research was funded by the Cooperative Program in Agricultural Marketing and Business, 
Department of Rural Economy, University of Alberta.  
2 Risk management may be defined as choosing among alternative strategies to reduce 
risks. 
3 This information was used in other analysis not dealt with in this paper. 
4  Normative  belief  indicates  the  likelihood  that  a  significant  other  would  think  the 
respondent  should  approve  additional  borrowing.  Motivation  to  comply  captures 
respondents’ willingness to do what each referent thought they should do with respect to 
additional borrowing.  
5 Model II is meant to explore the impact of additional information on DMs’ behavioural 
intentions to approve additional borrowing. 